Practical and unconditionally secure spacetime-constrained oblivious
  transfer by Pitalúa-García, Damián & Kerenidis, Iordanis
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
07
41
0v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
18
 N
ov
 20
18
Practical and unconditionally secure spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer
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Spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT) extends the fundamental primitive of oblivious
transfer to Minkowski space. SCOT and location oblivious data transfer (LODT) are the only known
cryptographic tasks with classical inputs and outputs for which unconditional security needs both
quantum theory and relativity. We give an unconditionally secure SCOT protocol that, contrasting
previous SCOT and LODT protocols, is practical to implement with current technology, where
distant agents need only communicate classical information, while quantum communication occurs
at a single location. We also show that our SCOT protocol can be used to implement unconditionally
secure quantum relativistic bit commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The two main theories in physics are quantum the-
ory and relativity. Relativistic quantum cryptography
[1–3] investigates the security of cryptographic protocols
based on the physical principles of these theories. On
the one hand, the causality of Minkowski spacetime –
and of the approximately-Minkowski spacetime near the
Earth surface – implies that physical systems and in-
formation cannot travel faster than light. On the other
hand, quantum information cannot be cloned [4, 5], non-
orthogonal quantum states cannot be perfectly distin-
guished, quantum entanglement is monogamous [6], and
there are quantum correlations that violate Bell inequal-
ities [7].
Some cryptographic primitives can be implemented
with unconditional security based only on the principles
of quantum theory, for example, quantum key distribu-
tion [8–10], private randomness expansion [11–13], and
weak coin tossing with arbitrarily small bias [14]. How-
ever, other important cryptographic tasks are impossi-
ble to implement with unconditional security based only
on quantum theory, like bit commitment [15, 16], strong
coin tossing with arbitrarily small bias [17–19], oblivi-
ous transfer [20–22] and more general two-party classical
computation [20, 22, 23] – although there are quantum
protocols with strictly better security than classical pro-
tocols for bit commitment [24], strong coin tossing [25]
and oblivious transfer [26]. Nevertheless, Kent showed
that considering the causality of Minkowski spacetime
allows us to obtain unconditionally secure protocols for
strong coin tossing [2] and bit commitment [1, 27], even
if quantum theory is not considered.
It is interesting to ask whether there are cryptographic
primitives whose unconditional security requires both
quantum theory and relativity. While unconditionally
secure protocols for oblivious transfer remain impossi-
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ble to implement even with relativistic quantum proto-
cols [22, 28], unconditionally secure protocols for its vari-
ants location-oblivious data transfer (LODT) [29] and
spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT) [30] ex-
ist in relativistic quantum settings. However, uncondi-
tionally secure LODT and SCOT are impossible when
based only on quantum theory, or in relativity. Only
the combined properties of quantum information and
Minkowski causality can allow for unconditionally se-
cure LODT and SCOT protocols [29, 30]. As far as
we know, LODT and SCOT are the only known cryp-
tographic tasks with classical inputs and outputs whose
unconditional security necessitates both quantum theory
and relativity.
LODT and SCOT are relativistic extensions of obliv-
ious transfer. The primitive of one-out-of-two oblivious
transfer [31] is informally defined as follows. Alice has
two bits x0, x1 and Bob has a bit b. At the end of the pro-
tocol, Bob must learn xb but not xb¯, and Alice must not
learn b. While somewhat abstract, oblivious transfer is
related to private information retrieval and is a universal
primitive, meaning that any secure computation between
Alice and Bob can be reduced to this simple primitive
[32]. In LODT [29], Alice transfers a message to Bob at
a random spacetime location that neither Alice nor Bob
can determine in advance, and the location where Bob re-
ceives the message remains unknown to Alice. In SCOT
[30], Alice has two input messages x0, x1,and Bob has an
input bit b; Bob obtains xb in Rb, but he cannot obtain
xb¯ in Rb¯, where R0 and R1 are fixed spacelike separated
spacetime regions.
We motivate SCOT by the following scenario. Alice
wants to give access to Bob to one of two computers: C0
or C1. The computer Ci can only be accessed by Bob if
he inputs the password xi in the spacetime region Ri, for
i ∈ {0, 1}. Each computer reveals a different database to
Bob, or allows Bob to perform a different computational
process. Bob does not want to reveal which computer he
wants to access and Alice needs to make sure that Bob
does not get access to both computers. SCOT guaran-
tees that Bob can access one of the computers, without
Alice knowing which one. Moreover, Alice is certain that,
for a time interval, Bob cannot access the second com-
2puter too. Thus, by changing the access passwords before
this time interval expires, the protocol guarantees that
Bob can only access one of the computers. As mentioned
above, oblivious transfer is a very strong cryptographic
primitive [32]. SCOT is a strong cryptographic primitive
too, as we show below that it implements unconditionally
secure relativistic bit commitment.
Although there are unconditionally secure protocols for
LODT [29] and SCOT [30], these are not practical to
implement with current technology. On the one hand, the
LODT protocol of Ref. [29] requires preparation of two
qudits in a maximally entangled state and their secure
transmission over long distances. On the other hand,
the SCOT protocol of Ref. [30] requires preparation of
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [8] qubits and their secure
transmission over long distances – as long as hundreds of
kilometers if the time length of the regions Ri is of only
a few milliseconds – and, if Bob does not have quantum
memories to store the received qubits, the preparation
and transmission of a large number of BB84 states within
a very short time – not greater than the time length of
the regions Ri.
In this paper we introduce an unconditionally secure
SCOT protocol that is practical to implement with cur-
rent technology: it requires preparation, transmission
and measurement of BB84 qubits at a single location,
and secure transmission of classical information over long
distances, but it does not require quantum memories
or long-distance quantum communication. Furthermore,
the quantum communication in our protocol can take
an arbitrarily long time, while still giving Bob the free-
dom to chose his input b only slightly in the past of R0
and R1. This is the first practical and unconditionally
secure protocol of a cryptographic task whose uncon-
ditional security necessitates both quantum theory and
relativity. Our SCOT protocol can also be used to im-
plement unconditionally secure relativistic quantum bit
commitment.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe the setting of relativistic quantum cryptography
that applies to our protocol, we define the task of SCOT,
and we provide some mathematical notation. We present
our SCOT protocol in Sec. III. We show in Sec. IV that
our protocol is unconditionally secure. Some extensions
of our protocol are discussed in Sec. V, in particular to
deal with losses and errors. We discuss in Sec. VI how
our SCOT protocol can be used to implement uncondi-
tionally secure quantum relativistic bit commitment. We
conclude in Sec. VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The setting
The general model of relativistic quantum cryptogra-
phy was introduced by Kent [1–3]. Here, we detail the
specific setting of our protocol. Alice and Bob live in
Minkowski – or approximately Minkowski – spacetime.
Alice (Bob) consists of three different agents, denoted by
A, A0, A1 (B, B0, B1), each controlling a secure lab-
oratory adjacent to the space location L, L0, L1, hav-
ing finite spatial extension with set of three-dimensional
coordinates ∆LA,∆LA0 ,∆L
A
1 (∆L
B,∆LB0 ,∆L
B
1 ), respec-
tively. Alice and Bob agree on a particular reference
frame F with spacetime coordinates (t, x, y, z), where the
first entry is temporal, and where we set units in which
the speed of light through vacuum is unity. Here we
consider L = (0, 0, 0) and Li = (−(−1)ih, 0, 0), with the
maximum length extension of any laboratory being much
smaller than h, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
We assume the processing of classical and quantum in-
formation within each laboratory to be secure and with-
out errors, and the transmission of classical or quan-
tum systems between laboratories being free of errors
and losses. The communication between Alice’s (Bob’s)
agents is done through authenticated and secure classi-
cal channels, which can be implemented with previously
shared secret keys. There are classical channels between
Alice’s and Bob’s adjacent agents, i.e. between the pairs
(A,B), (A0,B0) and (A1,B1). There is a single quantum
channel between A and B. Note that the only quantum
communication is between agents at the same location,
an important difference with the setting in Ref. [30].
B. Definition of SCOT
As mentioned above, SCOT [30] is a relativistic vari-
ant of one-out-of-two oblivious transfer [31], defined as
follows. Alice and Bob agree on two spacelike separated
spacetime regions R0 and R1. Bob’s agent B inputs
b ∈ {0, 1} in the intersection of the causal pasts of all
the spacetime points of R0 and R1. For i ∈ {0, 1}, Al-
ice’s agent Ai inputs xi ∈ {0, 1}n in the causal past of
a spacetime point Qi of Ri – previously agreed by Alice
and Bob. The goal of the SCOT protocol is that Bb ob-
tains xb in Rb. A SCOT protocol is secure against Alice
if she cannot learn b anywhere in spacetime; it is secure
against Bob if the probability that B0 obtains x0 in R0
and B1 obtains x1 in R1 goes to zero as a function of
some security parameter, which here we take to be the
parameter n [30].
Here we considerRi = {(t, l)|h ≤ t ≤ h+∆h, l ∈ ∆LBi }
and Qi = (h,−(−1)ih, 0, 0), for i ∈ {0, 1}, where h > 0
and ∆h > 0. We note that Ri includes the spacetime
point Qi, for i ∈ {0, 1}. By definition of SCOT, R0
and R1 must be spacelike separated; hence, ∆h must be
smaller than the shortest time that light takes to travel
between ∆LB0 and ∆L
B
1 , requiring ∆h < 2h. B gener-
ates b within his laboratory in the past light cone of the
spacetime point P = (0, 0, 0, 0). For i ∈ {0, 1}, Ai inputs
xi within her laboratory in the past light cone of Qi.
3C. Notation
We define [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote the jth bit
entry of a string a ∈ {0, 1}n by aj , for j ∈ [n]. When ap-
plied to bits (bit strings) ⊕ denotes (bitwise) sum modulo
2. We denote the complement of a bit a by a¯ = a ⊕ 1,
and of a bit aj by a¯j . D0 =
{|0〉, |1〉} and D1 = {|0ˆ〉, |1ˆ〉}
denote the computational and Hadamard bases, respec-
tively, where |aˆ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)a|1〉), for a ∈ {0, 1}.
III. A PRACTICAL AND UNCONDITIONALLY
SECURE SCOT PROTOCOL
We present an unconditionally secure SCOT protocol,
consisting of two main stages. Stage I includes quantum
communication between the laboratories adjacent to lo-
cation L and can be completed within any finite time in
the past light cone of P . Stage II includes fast classi-
cal processing and communication between Alice’s and
Bob’s agents at the locations L, L0 and L1, as well as
classical communication between Alice’s (Bob’s) agents
at the locations L and Li, for i ∈ {0, 1}. Steps 1–6 take
place in the past of P . Our protocol is illustrated in Fig.
1.
A. Stage I
1. A generates the strings r0, r1, s ∈ {0, 1}n randomly
and securely and sends copies to Ai, who receives
them in the past light cone of Qi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
2. A prepares a set of 2n qubits {Aji}j∈[n]i∈{0,1} in BB84
states [8]. For j ∈ [n], the qubit pair Aj = Aj0Aj1 is
prepared in the state
∣∣ψsj
r
j
0
r
j
1
〉
A
j
0
A
j
1
=
∣∣rj0〉Aj
sj
⊗ ∣∣rˆj1〉Aj
s¯j
. (1)
We note that sj ∈ {0, 1} indicates which qubit in
the pair Aj is prepared in the basis D0 and which
one in D1. The qubits prepared in the basis Di
encode the string ri, for i ∈ {0, 1}. For i ∈ {0, 1}
and j ∈ [n], A sends the qubits Aji with their labels
i, j to B.
3. Before receiving the qubits from A, B randomly
chooses a bit c. For i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ [n], B
measures the qubits Aji in the basis Dc, obtaining
the bit outcomes dji , defining di = (d
1
i , d
2
i , . . . , d
n
i ).
For i ∈ {0, 1}, B sends c, d0 and d1 to Bi, with
reception in the past of Qi.
B. Stage II
4. B generates his bit input b and sends the bit b′ =
c⊕ b to A.
5. For i ∈ {0, 1}, B sends b to Bi, who receives it in
the past of Qi.
6. For i ∈ {0, 1}, A sends b′ to Ai, who receives it in
the past of Qi.
7. For i ∈ {0, 1}, Ai generates xi within her labora-
tory in the past of Qi, and gives ti = ri⊕b′⊕xi and
s to Bi at Qi.
8. Within the region Rb, Bb uses s, d0, d1, and c to
obtain (d1s1⊕c, . . . , d
n
sn⊕c), which equals rc. Then,
Bb outputs yb = rc ⊕ tb, which equals xb.
C. Comments and variations
We note that B has the freedom to choose b after all
the received qubits have been measured. This is useful
in situations where the quantum communication takes a
long time (e.g., several hours), while Bob wants to de-
cide which message to obtain within a short time (e.g.,
a fraction of a second) in the past of R0 and R1. Fur-
thermore, Alice has the freedom to generate her inputs
in real time; i.e., Ai can generate xi slightly in the past
of Qi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Different variations of the above protocol can be con-
sidered. For example, in one variation B does not send
b to his agents and Bi acts assuming that b = i, for
i ∈ {0, 1}. In another variation, A generates x0 and x1
in the past of P and sends xi to Ai, who receives it in
the past of Qi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Security against Alice
The only communication from Bob to Alice consists in
the bit b′ = c⊕ b. Since c is random and Bob’s laborato-
ries and classical channels are secure, Alice cannot obtain
any information about b. Thus, our protocol is perfectly
secure against Alice.
B. Security against Bob
Security against Bob follows from Minkowski causality
and the monogamy of entanglement. In a general cheat-
ing strategy by Bob, agent B introduces an ancilla E of
arbitrary finite dimension in some fixed pure state |χ〉,
and applies a unitary operation U on AE to obtain
|Φsr0r1〉B0B1B′ = UAE|Ψsr0r1〉A|χ〉E , (2)
where A = A10A
1
1 · · ·An0An1 , AE = B0B1B′, the systems
B0, B1, B
′ have arbitrary finite dimensions, and where
∣∣Ψsr0r1〉A =
n⊗
j=1
∣∣ψsj
r
j
0
r
j
1
〉
A
j
0
A
j
1
(3)
4FIG. 1. Illustration of the introduced SCOT protocol in a two-
dimensional spacetime diagram in the frame F of Minkowski
spacetime. The world lines of the laboratories of Alice’s
agents A, A0, A1 (green rectangles) and of the laboratories
of Bob’s agents B, B0, B1 (yellow rectangles) are indicated.
The small dots represent the spacetime points P = (0, 0, 0, 0),
Q0 = (h,−h, 0, 0), Q1 = (h, h, 0, 0) and P
′. The thin solid di-
agonal lines represent light rays, defining the light cones of P ,
Q0, Q1 and P
′. The spacetime regions Ri, where Bob’s agents
must obtain Alice’s inputs xi correspond to the small red rect-
angles, for i ∈ {0, 1}. The case b = 1 is illustrated. Top: Only
communication from Alice’s (Bob’s) agents to Bob’s (Alice’s)
agents and Bob’s output are illustrated (short black arrows
with thick solid lines). P ′ is the spacetime point with the
greatest time coordinate in F that lies within the intersection
of the past light cones of a point in R0 and a point in R1.
When the SCOT protocol is used to implement bit commit-
ment, Alice is guaranteed that Bob was committed to b from
t′, which is the time coordinate of P ′. Bottom: All communi-
cation processes, including those among Alice’s agents (long
maroon arrows with thin solid lines) and among Bob’s agents
(long blue arrows with dashed lines), are illustrated.
is the state that B receives from A. Then, B applies
a projective measurement {Rb′}b′∈{0,1} on B′ and sends
the outcome b′ to A. For i ∈ {0, 1}, B sends b′ and
Bi to Bi. Bi, after receiving s from Ai at Qi, applies a
projective measurement Misb′ = {Πeiisb′}ei∈{0,1}n on Bi
and obtains the outcome ei. Given that ti = ri⊕b′ ⊕ xi,
the goal of the measurementMisb′ is to obtain a string ei
that equals ri⊕b′ with high probability, so that Bi outputs
ei⊕ti, which equals xi with high probability. Thus, Bob’s
cheating probability is pn = P (e0 = rb′ , e1 = rb¯′), which
is given by
pn =
1
23n
∑
r0,r1,s,b′
〈Φsr0r1 |Π
rb′
0sb′ ⊗Πrb¯′1sb′ ⊗Rb
′ |Φsr0r1〉. (4)
Since the regions R0 and R1 at which Bob’s agents B0
and B1 must produce their outputs are spacelike sepa-
rated, it follows from Minkowski causality that, as given
by (4), B0 and B1 must obtain their outputs from mea-
surements on disjoint systems B0 and B1, which could
have only interacted in the intersection of the past light
cones of at least one point in R0 and one point in R1, i.e
in the past light cone of P ′ (see Fig. 1). Then, from the
monogamy of entanglement, the measurement outcomes
obtained by B0 and B1 cannot both be very correlated to
Alice’s inputs r0 and r1, which implies an upper bound
on pn. We show below that for any cheating strategy by
Bob we have
pn ≤
(1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)n
. (5)
Thus, pn → 0 exponentially with n, meaning that our
protocol is unconditionally secure.
It remains as an open question whether the security
bound (5) is tight. We describe in section IVC the
best cheating strategy by Bob that we have found, which
achieves pn =
(
3
4
)n
.
1. Proof of bound (5)
The main technical part of this paper is the proof of
bound (5). Our proof is a variation of the proof of a
bound for the monogamy-of-entanglement game given in
Ref. [33]. First, we note that it is equivalent in our
protocol if agent A prepares in the past of P the state
|Φ〉CA =
n⊗
j=1
(
|Φ+〉
C
j
0
A
j
0
⊗ |Φ+〉
C
j
1
A
j
1
)
, (6)
where C = C1C2 · · ·Cn, Cj = Cj0Cj1 and |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉). Then, in the past of P , A sends
A to B and measures Cj in the basis {∣∣ψsjr0r1〉}r0,r1∈{0,1}
for j ∈ [n]. With probability 14 , A measures Cj in the
state
∣∣ψsj
r
j
0
r
j
1
〉
C
j
0
C
j
1
and the pair of qubits Aj received by
B collapse into the state ∣∣ψsj
r
j
0
r
j
1
〉
A
j
0
A
j
1
. Bob’s unitary op-
eration U in his cheating strategy commutes with Alice’s
5measurements. Thus, we can consider that the global
system CB0B1B
′, before Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
are implemented, is in the state
|Ψ〉CB0B1B′ =
(
1C ⊗ UB0B1B′
)|Φ〉CA|χ〉E , (7)
where we recall that B0B1B
′ = AE, E is an ancilla,
and B0, B1 and B
′ have arbitrary finite Hilbert space di-
mensions. Then, A measures C in the orthonormal basis{∣∣Ψsr0r1〉}r0,r1∈{0,1}n according to her random value of
s ∈ {0, 1}n. With probability 122n , A measures
∣∣Ψsr0r1〉C
and B0B1B
′ projects into the state |Φsr0r1〉B0B1B′ . Then,
B applies the projective measurement {Rb′}b′∈{0,1} on B′
and obtains the bit outcome b′, which he sends to A. B
sends b′ and Bi to Bi, for i ∈ {0, 1}. After receiving s,
agent Bi applies the projective measurementMisb′ on Bi
at Qi. Thus, Bob’s cheating probability pn given by (4)
equals
pn =
1
2n
∑
s
Tr
(
TsΨ
)
, (8)
where Ψ =
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)
CB0B1B′
and
Ts =
1∑
b′=0
(
Db
′
s
)
CB0B1
⊗ (Rb′)
B′
, (9)
with
Db
′
s =
∑
r0,r1
(∣∣Ψsr0r1〉〈Ψsr0r1∣∣)C ⊗ (Πrb′0sb′)B0 ⊗ (Πrb¯′1sb′)B1 ,
(10)
for b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We derive bound (5) with the help of two lemmas of
Ref. [33]. Before stating these lemmas we provide some
useful notation. We denote by H the Hilbert space of
the global system CB0B1B
′, which as said before is ar-
bitrary but finite dimensional. We denote by L(H) and
by P(H) the sets of linear operators and of positive semi-
definite operators on H, respectively. For A,B ∈ L(H),
the expression A ≥ B means that A − B ∈ P(H). For
A ∈ L(H), ‖A‖ denotes the Schatten ∞−norm of A,
which gives the largest singular value of A, and which
coincides with its largest eigenvalue if A ∈ P(H).
Lemma 1. (Ref. [33]) Let A,B,L ∈ L(H) such that
A†A ≥ B†B. Then, it holds that ‖AL‖ ≥ ‖BL‖.
Lemma 2. (Ref. [33]) Let D1, D2, . . . , DN ∈ P(H), and
let {sk}k∈[N ] be a set of N mutually orthogonal permuta-
tions of [N ]. Then∥∥∥∥∑
i∈[N ]
Di
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∑
k∈[N ]
max
i∈[N ]
∥∥∥√Di√Dsk(i)∥∥∥. (11)
It follows from Lemma 1 that for A,A′, B,B′ ∈ P(H)
satisfyingA′ ≥ A andB′ ≥ B, it holds that ‖√A′√B′‖ ≥
‖√A′√B‖≥ ‖√A√B‖ [33]. Thus, if A,A′, B,B′ are
projectors on H satisfying A′ ≥ A and B′ ≥ B then
‖A′B′‖ ≥ ‖AB‖. We use this property below.
To use Lemma 2, we consider the set of permutations
of s given by s → sk = s ⊕ k, for k ∈ {0, 1}n. This is
a set of 2n mutually orthogonal permutations, that is,
sk 6= sk′ if k 6= k′ for all s ∈ {0, 1}n.
We have
pn =
1
2n
Tr
(∑
s
TsΨ
)
≤ 1
2n
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s
Ts
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2n
∥∥∥∥∥
1∑
b′=0
∑
s
Db
′
s ⊗Rb
′
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2n
max
b′
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s
Db
′
s
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
2n
max
b′
∑
k
max
s
∥∥∥Db′s Db′sk
∥∥∥, (12)
where in the first line we used the linearity of the trace,
in the second line we used the definition of the Schatten
∞−norm, in the third line we used (9), in the fourth line
we used that {R0, R1} is a projective measurement, and
in the last line we used Lemma 2 and the fact that Db
′
s
and Db
′
sk
are projectors.
We define the projectors
F b
′
s =
∑
r0,r1
(∣∣Ψsr0r1〉〈Ψsr0r1 ∣∣)C ⊗ (Πrb′0sb′)B0 ⊗ 1B1 ,
Gb
′
sk
=
∑
r0,r1
(∣∣Ψskr0r1〉〈Ψskr0r1 ∣∣)C ⊗ 1B0 ⊗ (Πrb¯′1skb′)B1 ,
(13)
for b′ ∈ {0, 1} and s,k ∈ {0, 1}n. We see that they satisfy
Db
′
s ≤ F b
′
s and D
b′
sk
≤ Gb′sk . Thus, we have from Lemma
1 that
‖Db′s Db
′
sk
‖2 ≤ ‖F b′s Gb
′
sk
‖2 = ‖F b′s Gb
′
sk
F b
′
s ‖, (14)
where the equality follows from the property ‖A‖2 =
‖AA†‖ = ‖A†A‖ for any A ∈ L(H) [33] and from the
fact that F b
′
s and G
b′
sk
are projectors. We show in Ap-
pendix A that
‖F b′s Gb
′
sk
F b
′
s ‖ =
(1
2
)ωk
, (15)
where ωk is the Hamming weight of k. Thus, since for
any b′ ∈ {0, 1} and for a fixed k, the value of ‖F b′s Gb
′
sk
F b
′
s ‖
is the same for any s ∈ {0, 1}n, we have from (12), (14)
and (15) that
pn ≤ 1
2n
∑
k
( 1√
2
)ωk
. (16)
6There are exactly
(
n
ω
)
values of k ∈ {0, 1}n with Ham-
ming weight ω. Thus, from (16), we obtain
pn ≤ 1
2n
n∑
ω=0
(
n
ω
)( 1√
2
)ω
=
(1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)n
, (17)
which is the claimed bound (5).
C. A cheating strategy by Bob without the use of
any quantum channels or quantum memories
We present a cheating strategy by Bob that achieves
pn =
(
3
4
)n
. Interestingly, Bob’s agents do not need any
quantum memories or quantum channels to perform this
strategy.
Bob’s agent B gives the bit b′ = 0 to Alice’s agent A.
Thus, Bob’s agent Bi must obtain the string ri in Ri, for
i ∈ {0, 1}. In the past of P , agent B applies a projective
measurement on the pair of qubits Aj in the orthonormal
basis defined by the following states:
|ξ00〉 =
√
3
2
|ψ000〉 −
1
2
√
3
(−|ψ001〉+ |ψ010〉+ |ψ011〉)
|ξ01〉 =
√
3
2
|ψ001〉 −
1
2
√
3
(|ψ000〉 − |ψ010〉+ |ψ011〉)
|ξ10〉 =
√
3
2
|ψ010〉 −
1
2
√
3
(−|ψ000〉+ |ψ001〉+ |ψ011〉)
|ξ11〉 = −
√
3
2
|ψ011〉 −
1
2
√
3
(|ψ000〉+ |ψ001〉+ |ψ010〉).
(18)
We denote the outcomes by
∣∣ξlj〉, where lj = (lj0, lj1) ∈
{0, 1}2, for j ∈ [n]. Agent B sends the outcomes lj with
their labels j to his agent Bi, who receives them in the
past of Qi, for j ∈ [n] and i ∈ {0, 1}. After receiving s
at Qi from Ai, agent Bi guesses that Alice prepared the
pair of qubits Aj in the state |ψ0
lj
〉 if sj = 0 or in the
state
∣∣ψ1
f(lj)
〉
if sj = 1, where f(00) = 01, f(01) = 11,
f(10) = 10 and f(11) = 00. Thus, Bi outputs ei =
(e1i , e
2
i , . . . , e
n
i ), with e
j
i = l
j
i if s
j = 0, or with eji being
the ith entry of f(lj) if sj = 1. Bob’s cheating probability
pn = P (e0 = r0, e1 = r1) following this strategy is pn =
(p)n, where
p =
1
8
(∣∣〈ψ000∣∣ξ00〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈ψ001∣∣ξ01〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈ψ010∣∣ξ10〉∣∣2
+
∣∣〈ψ011∣∣ξ11〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈ψ100∣∣ξ11〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈ψ101∣∣ξ00〉∣∣2
+
∣∣〈ψ110∣∣ξ10〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈ψ111∣∣ξ01〉∣∣2). (19)
From the definition (1) for the states |ψsr0r1〉, we can eas-
ily derive the relations
∣∣ψ100〉 = 12
(∣∣ψ000〉+ ∣∣ψ001〉+ ∣∣ψ010〉+ ∣∣ψ011〉)∣∣ψ101〉 = 12(
∣∣ψ000〉+ ∣∣ψ001〉− ∣∣ψ010〉− ∣∣ψ011〉)∣∣ψ110〉 = 12(
∣∣ψ000〉− ∣∣ψ001〉+ ∣∣ψ010〉− ∣∣ψ011〉)∣∣ψ111〉 = 12
(∣∣ψ000〉− ∣∣ψ001〉− ∣∣ψ010〉+ ∣∣ψ011〉). (20)
Using (18) – (20) it is straightforward to compute p = 34 .
Thus, this cheating strategy by Bob achieves a success
probability pn =
(
3
4
)n
, as claimed.
V. EXTENSIONS OF OUR SCOT PROTOCOL
We discuss possible extensions of the SCOT protocol
of Sec. III. First, we note that in the SCOT protocol
of Sec. III Bob is guaranteed that the pair of qubits Aj
encodes the bits xj0 and x
j
1 via the bits r
j
0 and r
j
1. In a
straightforward extension of our protocol, among the 2n
qubits that Alice prepares from the BB84 set (n in the
computational basis and n in the Hadamard basis), she
chooses randomly the positions of the qubits encoding
the bits rji , for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ [n]. Clearly, this
modification in the protocol cannot make it easier for
Bob to cheat; hence, unconditional security remains. We
leave as an open question whether this extended protocol
achieves strictly better security against Bob.
Secondly, the SCOT protocol of Sec. III considers the
ideal situation in which there are not any errors dur-
ing the protocol and that there are not any losses of the
transmitted quantum systems. This protocol is straight-
forwardly extended to deal with these problems.
A. Dealing with losses
To deal with losses, B reports to A in the past of P a
set S ⊆ [n] of labels j of two-qubit systems Aj = Aj0Aj1
for which both Aj0 and A
j
1 activate a detection. The
protocol continues as the original one, but with input
strings sS , rS0 , r
S
1 , d
S
0 , d
S
1 , x
S
0 , x
S
1 instead of s, r0, r1,
d0, d1, x0, x1, where a
S ∈ {0, 1}N denotes the restriction
of a ∈ {0, 1}n in S, and where N = |S|. Security against
Bob follows from bound (5) but with security parameter
N instead of n. Since Bob’s agent B gives Alice the bit
b′ = c ⊕ b, in order to guarantee security against Alice,
B must make sure that announcing the detection events
does not leak any information about the measurement
choice c, which implies that no information about Bob’s
input b is given to Alice. For this, B must experimentally
verify that the detection probabilities of the two-qubit
systems Aj received from A are independent of whether
they are measured in the basis D0 ⊗ D0 or in the basis
D1 ⊗D1.
7B. Dealing with errors
In order to deal with noise in the system we extend the
setting of SCOT. As before, in the past light cone of Qi,
Alice’s agent Ai has the input xi ∈ {0, 1}n, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
In the past light cone of P , Bob’s agent B has as an input
b ∈ {0, 1}. However, now, the goal of the protocol is that
Bob obtains a string yb ∈ {0, 1}n in Rb such that yb dif-
fers from xb in at most γn bit entries, for some γ ∈ (0, 1)
agreed in advanced by Alice and Bob. As before, security
against Alice means that she cannot learn b anywhere in
spacetime. Security against Bob means that Bob can-
not obtain a string y0 in R0 and a string y1 in R1, such
that yi differs from xi in at most γn bit entries for both
i = 0 and i = 1. According to the motivation of SCOT
outlined in the Introduction, this means that Bob cannot
access both computers, one being accessed in R0 and the
other one being accessed in R1, where the corresponding
computer can be accessed if the password provided by
Bob’s agent differs from the original password given by
Alice’s agent in at most γn bit entries. It can be shown
that our protocol remains unconditionally secure as long
as γ is small enough. In particular, we show below that
our protocol remains secure if γ < 0.015.
Bob’s cheating probability in the extended setting, the
probability that both agents B0 and B1 output valid pass-
words, is
pγn =
1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
∑
s
Tr
(
T qs Ψ
)
, (21)
where Ψ =
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)
CB0B1B′
, with |Ψ〉CB0B1B′ given by
(7), and T qs is a projector given by
T qs =
1∑
b′=0
(
Dqb
′
s
)
CB0B1
⊗ (Rb′)
B′
, (22)
with
Dqb
′
s =
∑
r0,r1
[(∣∣Ψsr0r1〉〈Ψsr0r1 ∣∣)C ⊗ (Πrb′⊕q00sb′ )B0 ×
×⊗ (Πrb¯′⊕q11sb′ )B1
]
; (23)
and where q = (q0,q1) ∈ Qγn ≡
{
(q0,q1)
∣∣qi ∈
{0, 1}n,W(qi) ≤ γn for i = 0, 1
}
, with W(qi) denoting
the Hamming weight of qi, for fixed γ ∈ [0, 1]. We show
in Appendix B that
pγn ≤
∣∣Qγn∣∣(12 + 12√2
)n
. (24)
For γ ≤ 12 , we have
∣∣Qγn∣∣ ≤ 22nh(γ), which is shown
in Sec. 1.4 of Ref. [34], where h(γ) = −γ log2 γ − (1 −
γ) log2(1 − γ) is the binary entropy of γ. Thus, we have
from (24) that
pγn ≤ 22nh(γ)
(1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)n
. (25)
For γ < 0.015, we have 22h(γ)
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)
< 1; hence,
pγn → 0 exponentially with n, which means unconditional
security for γ < 0.015.
VI. UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE BIT
COMMITMENT FROM SCOT
In bit commitment, Bob commits a bit b to Alice by
giving her some proof of his commitment but without
telling her the value of b, until he unveils his commit-
ment to her. The security guarantee is twofold: Alice
cannot learn b before Bob unveils, and if Alice accepts
Bob’s unveiled bit b as valid, she is guaranteed that Bob
was committed to b at least from some time t′ in the past.
Similarly to the SCOT protocol of Ref. [30], the SCOT
protocol presented here can be used to implement uncon-
ditionally secure relativistic bit commitment, as follows
(see Fig 1). To commit to b ∈ {0, 1}, Bob runs the SCOT
protocol with input b. To unveil the committed bit b,
Bob’s agent Bb obtains xb within Rb, and then sends xb
immediately to Alice’s adjacent agent Ab. Ab accepts b
as a valid commitment only if she receives xb from Bb
within the time interval [h, h+∆h], i.e., in the boundary
of Rb that is adjacent to her laboratory.
It follows from the security of SCOT that this bit
commitment protocol is unconditionally secure. Security
against Alice follows trivially because our SCOT proto-
col is secure against Alice; hence, Alice does not know b
until Bob unveils.
Security against Bob means that if Ab accepts b as a
valid commitment then Ab is guaranteed that Bob was
committed to b from t′, the time coordinate of P ′, which
is the spacetime point with the greatest time coordinate
(in the frame F) that lies in the intersection of the past
light cones of a point in R0 and a point in R1. Security
against Bob follows from Minkowski causality and the
monogamy of entanglement, similarly as in the security
analysis of our SCOT protocol. Namely, in any cheating
strategy, Bob must send in the past of P ′ a system Bi to
agent Bi, who measures the system using the information
received from Alice’s agent Ai and obtains his guess for
her input xi in Ri, for i ∈ {0, 1}. The probability pn,
given by (4), that Bob obtains both x0 in R0 and x1 in
R1 is upper bounded by (5). This means that for any
cheating strategy followed by Bob, if we denote pi as
the probability that Bob unveils b = i successfully, for
i ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + pn. Since pn → 0
exponentially with n, our bit commitment protocol is
unconditionally secure against Bob.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a practical unconditionally secure SCOT
protocol, where spatially separated agents need only
communicate classical information, while quantum com-
munication is only between agents at the same location,
8and which can be implemented with current technology.
This is the first practical and unconditionally secure pro-
tocol of a cryptographic task whose unconditional se-
curity is possible in a quantum relativistic world, but
impossible in a classical world, or in a quantum non-
relativistic world [29, 30].
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Appendix A: Proof of Eq. (15)
We show (15) for the case b′ = 0. The proof for the
case b′ = 1 follows straightforwardly by interchanging B0
and B1. To simplify notation, in what follows we take
Πr00s ≡ Πr00s0, Πr11sk ≡ Πr11sk0, Fs ≡ F 0s and Gsk ≡ G0sk . For
fixed s and k, we denote by sj and sjk the jth entries of
s and sk = s ⊕ k, respectively, and we define the sets
τ =
{
j ∈ [n]
∣∣sj 6= sjk} and τc = {j ∈ [n]∣∣sj = sjk}. Let
ωk be the Hamming weight of k, hence, |τ | = ωk. Using
the definitions (1), (3), and (13) of the main text, we
express Fs and Gsk by
Fs =
∑
r0,r1
[⊗
j∈τ
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|rˆj1〉〈rˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
⊗
j∈τc
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|rˆj1〉〈rˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
⊗
1B1
]
,
Gsk =
∑
r0,r1
[⊗
j∈τ
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
s
j
k
⊗ (|rˆj1〉〈rˆj1|)Cj
s¯
j
k
)
×
×
⊗
j∈τc
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
s
j
k
⊗ (|rˆj1〉〈rˆj1|)Cj
s¯
j
k
)
×
×
⊗
1B0
⊗(
Πr11sk
)
B1
]
. (A1)
Below we compute FsGskFs. We express the left-hand
operator Fs in terms of the dummy variables r0 and r1,
and the right-hand one in terms of z0 and z1. The oper-
ator Gsk is expressed in terms of w0 and w1. From the
definitions of τ and τc, we have that s¯
j = sjk and s¯
j
k = s
j
for j ∈ τ , and sjk = sj and s¯jk = s¯j for j ∈ τc. Using
these properties and Πr00sΠ
z0
0s = δr0,z0Π
r0
0s, since
{
Πr00s
}
r0
is a projective measurement, we obtain
FsGskFs =
∑
r0,r1
w0,w1
z1
[⊗
j∈τ
[((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|rˆj1〉〈rˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
((∣∣wˆj1〉〈wˆj1|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|wj0〉〈wj0|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|zˆj1〉〈zˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)]
×
×
⊗
j∈τc
[((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|rˆj1〉〈rˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
((∣∣wj0〉〈wj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|wˆj1〉〈wˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|zˆj1〉〈zˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)]
×
×
⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
⊗(
Πw11sk
)
B1
]
. (A2)
Then we use that
∑1
a=0|a〉〈a| =
∑1
a=0|aˆ〉〈aˆ| = 1 (the
identity on a qubit) to obtain, after summing over
r1,w0, z1, that
FsGskFs =
∑
r0,w1
[⊗
j∈τ
(∣∣〈rj0∣∣wˆj1〉∣∣2(∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ 1
C
j
s¯j
)
×
×
⊗
j∈τc
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|wˆj1〉〈wˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
⊗(
Πw11sk
)
B1
]
. (A3)
Since
∣∣〈rj0∣∣wˆj1〉∣∣2 = 12 and |τ | = ωk, it follows that
FsGskFs =
(1
2
)ωk ∑
r0,w1
[⊗
j∈τ
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ 1
C
j
s¯j
)
×
×
⊗
j∈τc
((∣∣rj0〉〈rj0|)Cj
sj
⊗ (|wˆj1〉〈wˆj1|)Cj
s¯j
)
×
×
⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
⊗(
Πw11sk
)
B1
]
. (A4)
Using that
{
Πr00s
}
r0
and
{
Πw11sk
}
w1
are projective mea-
surements, it is straightforward to see from (A4) that
2ωkFsGskFs is a projector. Thus, ‖2ωkFsGskFs‖ = 1,
which implies (15). The bound (5) of the main text and
security against Bob follow.
9Appendix B: Proof of bound (24)
We show (24). We follow closely the proof of bound
(5). We have
pγn =
1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
Tr
(∑
s
T qs Ψ
)
≤ 1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s
T qs
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
∥∥∥∥∥
1∑
b′=0
∑
s
Dqb
′
s ⊗Rb
′
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
max
b′
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s
Dqb
′
s
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
max
b′
∑
k
max
s
∥∥∥Dqb′s Dqb′sk
∥∥∥, (B1)
where in the first line we used the linearity of the trace,
in the second line we used the definition of the Schatten
∞−norm ‖·‖, in the third line we used (22), in the fourth
line we used that {R0, R1} is a projective measurement,
and in the last line we used Lemma 2 and the fact that
Dqb
′
s and D
qb′
sk
are projectors.
We define the projectors
Fqb
′
s =
∑
r0,r1
(∣∣Ψsr0r1〉〈Ψsr0r1 ∣∣)C ⊗ (Πrb′⊕q00sb′ )B0 ⊗ 1B1 ,
Gqb
′
sk
=
∑
r0,r1
(∣∣Ψskr0r1〉〈Ψskr0r1 ∣∣)C ⊗ 1B0 ⊗ (Πrb¯′⊕q11skb′ )B1 ,
(B2)
which satisfy Dqb
′
s ≤ Fqb
′
s and D
qb′
sk
≤ Gqb′sk . Thus, from
Lemma 1 we have that
‖Dqb′s Dqb
′
sk
‖2 ≤ ‖Fqb′s Gqb
′
sk
‖2 = ‖Fqb′s Gqb
′
sk
Fqb
′
s ‖, (B3)
where the equality follows from ‖A‖2 = ‖AA†‖ = ‖A†A‖,
satisfied for any linear operator A [33], and from the fact
that Fqb
′
s and G
qb′
sk
are projectors.
Following the proof of (15) in Appendix A, it is
straightforward to show that
‖Fqb′s Gqb
′
sk
Fqb
′
s ‖ =
(1
2
)ωk
, (B4)
where ωk is the Hamming weight of k. Thus, from (B1),
(B3) and (B4), we obtain
pγn ≤
1
2n
∑
q∈Qγn
∑
k
( 1√
2
)ωk
=
|Qγn|
2n
n∑
ω=0
(
n
ω
)( 1√
2
)ω
= |Qγn|
(1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)n
, (B5)
which is the claimed bound (24).
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